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A Remark on Silence and Listening
Paolo Valesio 
Before Beginning
Why “remark”? Because I am still developing the theory, and 
also because this is a short presentation. Why “a” remark rather than 
“some” remarks? Because this is not a series of different lines of thought 
constellated around one leading theme (that is what we have in mind 
when we speak of “some remarks on. . . .”); it is rather a single thread 
of thinking which weaves its way through different places, acquires 
various colors when coming under different lights, and yet remains (no 
matter how thin, no matter how often exposed to the danger of breaking) 
that same single thread.
A last prefatory word, this time on the small specifi c occasion 
within the larger occasion celebrated at Rockhurst Hall and in this 
volume. In April 1964 Father Ong gave, at Yale University, a series of 
conferences within the well-known program of the Terry Lectures, whose 
expanded text was later published (Ong 1967). More than twenty years 
after Father Ong delivered his impressive lectures at Yale, a person from 
the university who came across his lectures a long time after they were 
published submits his thinking to him, as a homage to the inspiration he 
received. And this is more than an academic homage, more even than 
a purely intellectual tribute. My coming to such a place as Rockhurst 
College, in the heart of America, is a way of coming back to my spiritual 
roots. That such roots happen to have struck fi rst on European soil does 
not, given the nature of what is involved, make a great difference.
This brief autobiographical excursus is here presented only to 
explain what otherwise would have appeared a temerity: that is, my 
speaking of spiritual matters here, in front of an audience
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where so many are masters in the arts of the spirit. 
A remark on silence and listening
“Remember the day in which, without fear in your 
heart, you met your fi rst silence”
(Maurice Maeterlinck)
Listening as a crucial spiritual category is not a novelty. It is 
an important element in many religious traditions—certainly in the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition (but such an experience is by no means alien 
to Buddhism, for instance). It is also present in some contemporary 
philosophical theories (e.g., see Heidegger 1962:207, passim). But 
it seems to me that Heidegger’s great subtlety in this case is that of 
constantly playing an ontology of saying up against an ontology of 
silence. As for cultural and literary criticism: certain signs of a renewal 
of attention for the category of listening (cf. Barthes and Havas 1977) 
mark only the beginning of the necessary development.
What I am sketching here, on the other hand, is a defi nite option 
for listening—which as such has to face all the attendant dangers, 
designated by terms that still for too many are words of opprobrium, 
like quietism. Listening is considered here not as a sort of dialogical 
taking turns (a mechanical, temporary alternative to speaking), but as 
the crowning of the activity of saying, when the latter is pushed to its 
limits. The only way to really implement the paradox of silence—if we 
want to go on doing rhetoric, writing, literary criticism, translation—is 
to take up the stance, not of the silentiarius so much as of the listener.
The position I am delineating has something in common with 
that of the mystic, but it should not be simplistically identifi ed with 
it. For its concern is discourse in general and within it that particular 
ethic/aesthetic combination that is the literary text. What takes place 
in this process is not a series of occasional borrowings; this rhetorical 
approach is a spiritual interchange, not a form of confessional or 
technical dependency.
Contemplation is a word that has come to be associated almost 
exclusively with vision; but its etymon (going back to Latin templum) 
points in the direction of a more general notion, having to do with 
space.
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When, therefore, I speak of this listening as a contemplation, I 
do not mean a passive looking on, but the rearrangement of the space 
around a text. Thus listening to what a text has to say has little to do 
with the modernistic tradition of purely immanent criticism, which 
takes a kind of idolatrous pride in staying within the single text that it 
examines.
On the contrary, by creating a space of silence around a text this 
approach fi rst of all does something to the text (it is not passive); in the 
second place, by surrounding the text with the silence of a contemplation, 
this critical listening liberates energies and connections in the text which 
lead outside of it, broadening the spiritual background of the whole 
enterprise. In this way the rhetorical analysis does not superimpose 
an alien metalanguage on the literary text, but comes closest to the 
position of the writer, because it brings to the fore the crucial element of 
contemplation that is implicit in every act of writing.
A concrete illustration will be helpful. One of the least known 
among the many short stories that Luigi Pirandello published in literary 
magazines around the turn of the century and started issuing in book-
length collections from 1901 on is the one titled “Canta l’Epistola” 
[“He-who-intones-the-Epistle”], a phrase which is the nickname of the 
defrocked seminarian who is the hero of the little story (Cf. Pirandello 
1985, I:482-90).
Tommasino, who because of his change of heart has become an 
object of scorn and ridicule for his father and for the other inhabitants 
of his village, leads a chaste and solitary life, a life for which the term 
“contemplation” could be used—with the specifi cation, however, that 
Tommasino’s experience is not a systematically religious one (he has 
left organized faith), but an asystematic way of looking at, listening to, 
things.
In the course of his musings, Tommasino concentrates his 
attention on one single blade of grass, growing wild near a little 
abandoned church, in a hilly spot he regulary visits in his walks. It is 
not that he takes care of it in an active way (watering it, for instance): he 
simply follows its life, rejoicing in its growth and duration. But one day 
a young lady passes by, sits in that spot and, getting up to continue her 
walk, absent-mindedly rips off that blade of grass, putting it between 
her teeth.
“You idiot!” cries out Tommasino in exasperation. The young 
lady, astonished at this insult on the part of a person with whom she 
never exchanged a word, reports the episode to her
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fi ancé, an army lieutenant who happens to be a very good shot. He asks 
for an explanation that naturally the young man cannot offer: slapped by 
the offi cer, Tommasino accepts the challenge to a duel, and is mortally 
wounded by a pistol shot. To the priest who kneeling by his death-bed 
asks him the meaning of all this (“But why, my son? Why?”):
Tommasino, with half-shut eyes, with a weakened voice, in the midst 
of a sigh which turned into a very tender smile, simply answered: 
“Father, it happened because of a blade of grass. . . .” And everybody 
believed that he had remained delirious until his dying hour.1
Such are the closing lines of what I do not claim to be one of 
Pirandello’s greatest achievements, although it is a remarkable story. 
The initial part of this short story is a little too didactic and expository 
in tone; given the brevity of the text, this weakens the concentration.2 
But I am not putting together an essay on Pirandello (and at any rate, 
the minor texts of an important writer are crucial for his or her critical 
assessment); my purpose is to implement a certain way of thinking about 
literature, and this intelligently sensitive story is a signifi cant emblem. 
Let me then briefl y sketch certain basic critical responses which are 
possible here.
A fi rst possibility is what can be called a naive reading. Such a 
reading would not look behind or beyond the text: what it would see is 
a bizarre anecdote, wry and faintly moving—in short (according to the 
circular move characteristic of a certain handbook style) a “typically 
Pirandellian” text. As most naive readings, this one is essentially right. 
But, again, as most naive readings, it does not have enough force to 
restrain the questing or questioning reader as he or she is drawn to go 
deeper: with all the attendant risks (and challenges) of tortuosity, of 
endless erring through the maze of interpretation.
Indeed, the possibility of what might be called an astute reading 
quickly emerges here. Consider.
Contrary to the coarsely voiced suspicions about the reasons 
behind his leaving the seminary, Tommasino is (as noted) completely 
chaste: “. . . no woman could have claimed to have received as much as a 
passing glance from him” (20). A post-Freudian reader will immediately 
suspect repression at work here; and such suspicions would be rewarded, 
given the way the
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growth of that blade of grass is described—the blade of grass which 
Tommasino
had followed almost with a motherly tenderness in its slow growing 
among the other and shorter ones which were around it; and he had 
seen it rise---shy at fi rst, in its quivering slenderness---above the two 
encrusted rocks, as if it were fearful and at the same time curious, 
in its admiration of the sight that opened up beneath it—the green, 
boundless plain; and then he had seen it stand up taller and taller, 
bold and self-confi dent, with a small reddish tassel on its top, like 
the comb of a young rooster.
Indeed, the phallic symbol seems so blatant here that the reader 
could incline to regard this too explicit delineation as further proof of 
the relative immaturity of the author’s narrative skills at this stage. Such 
an impression could be confi rmed by the following images:
Tommasino’s joy at fi nding it every time intact, with its defi ant 
small tassel (pennacchietto) on top, was indescribable. He stroked it 
with the utmost delicacy, he smoothed it using only two fi ngers; it 
was as if he guarded it with his soul and breath. And in the evening, 
on leaving the stalk, he entrusted it to the early stars which began 
rising in the dusky sky, so that they and all their sisters would watch 
over it during the night. And really, with his mind’s eye, from afar, 
he saw that blade of grass of his, between the two rocks, under the 
thickly crowded stars sparkling in the black sky, which kept watch 
over it.
Once again, it would seem that the symbolic infrastructure of 
the tale is (“and thereby hangs a tale”) almost embarrassingly clear.3 
With this kind of preparation the culminating image in the story, which 
triggers Tommasino’s insult, appears almost to quiver on the edge of 
pornography. The young lady
absent-mindedly stretching her hand, had pulled up precisely that 
blade of grass and had stuck it between her teeth, with the small 
tassel hanging out. Tommasino Unzio had felt his soul tear, and he 
had not been able to resist the impulse to cry out to her: “You idiot!” 
when she had passed in front of him, with that
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stalk in her mouth.4
No further elaboration is necessary here: the whole development 
of a certain kind of critical reading is already unfolding before your 
eyes. Such a reading I would defi ne as hypercritical. Now, the kind 
of listening criticism that I am proposing avoids both the hypocriticism 
(if I may use this new coinage) of the naive reading—which at any rate 
is certainly not hypocritical, in the current sense of the word—and the 
hypercriticism of the astute reading.
But such a characterization does not imply any condescending 
or polemical attitude toward the readings which have been sketched. 
Anxiously setting one interpretation against the other is typical of that 
phônomakhein (“waging battles of words”) which has been already 
defused and refused by the ancient Greek Skeptics; and at any rate 
such an attitude would be clearly contrary to the listening approach 
advocated in this essay. Indeed, in order to be serious, such a listening 
must be understanding and comprehensive: it must listen not only to 
the texts but, with equal attention and respect, to all interpretations that 
have grown, or can grow, around them. The rhetorical ontology recovers 
the whole textual complex (including, I repeat, critical interpretations) 
as part of a common effort—to bring things to expression, to transform 
Being into forms of being. This enterprise is objectively shared by all 
the components of textual work, beyond all appearances of division, of 
competitive struggle.
Within such a restorative enterprise there is no neglect of 
differentiations (indeed they are developed and discussed, as we just 
saw); but there is no space for the sharp, absolutist polemics that removes 
and discards. So much is this true, that the reading of “Canta l’Epistola” 
that I am going to briefl y delineate in the next few lines grows out of a 
careful listening to the possible readings sketched above, and is meant 
as an integration of them, not as a way of scoring points with respect to 
them (cf. Valesio 1981).
What does it mean, in this specifi c case, to listen? To say that 
one listens to the text is not specifi c enough; if we leave it at that, what 
we have is a slightly more intense way of repeating what (in a different 
parlance) literary criticism has been saying for a long time. What we 
actually have to do is to listen to what Tommasino is listening to: the 
voice of mute things.5
It could be objected that this is a counter-intuitive way of
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describing the situation, for what Tommasino is doing is not listening 
to, but looking at; the whole text in fact is (as my quotes from it have 
shown) textured on images that have to do with sight. But precisely this 
is the epistemological turning point.
If we confi ne ourselves to looking at what Tommasino is looking 
at, then we are in the same position as all the other people around him: 
we do not see anything (because nobody, under normal conditions, 
really sees a blade of grass); therefore we conclude, quite reasonably, 
that Tommasino is crazy; and his reaction to Miss Olga (the lieutenant’s 
fi ancée)—who, as all of us normally do, handles the blade of grass 
without really seeing it—appears as totally arbitrary. But what really 
explains Tommasino’s behavior is that he is listening to a message. Only 
if we accept this are we ready to grant a human value to his actions. So 
long as he is seen as merely looking at the stalk, his attitude appears 
as a perverse one, as a way of avoiding mature relationships between 
human beings, stooping down to a form of life which lies below such 
relationships; it would be, then, a one-way connection which, although 
defi nitely not brutal, looks brutish—a stunting and impoverishing 
attitude. And yet—”The religious sentiment arises from. . . a brute 
conation of human nature,” as is noted in a series of philosophical 
refl ections of those years (The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918; 
see Alexander 1920, 2:406 and 407, “the brute sentiment for deity”).
More specifi cally, if we accept the fact that in doing what he 
does Tommasino is listening to a voice, then this very act of listening 
confers human dignity on this relationship.6 “Human dignity,” I said—
but how can one speak of this, when the relationship at issue does not 
take place between two humans, two full persons? The answer is found 
in a religious notion which can also be considered as a paradox: the 
predominantly Judaeo-Christian concept of rooting human dignity in 
a relation with the transcendental. It turns out, then, that Tommasino’s 
loss of faith is not a mere sociological fact in the background of the 
story; much less is it a kind of stage to be passed through on one’s way 
to a more sophisticated view of the world. Tommasino is, to be sure, 
thinking/feeling in the wake of the abandonment of an institutionalized, 
confessional faith, but his thinking/feeling is still a response to that 
faith.
This situates our text in its appropriate context, which is a very 
broad spiritual landscape. In this sense, Pirandello’s short
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story comes to look like that stalk of grass, and the context necessary 
in order to really listen to what it is saying appears now as that great 
plain which spreads below; recall the passage about the blade of grass 
that grows “as if it were fearful and at the same time curious, in its 
admiration of the sight that opened up beneath it—the green, boundless 
plain.” Like every intense interrogation in the territory of Christianity, 
Tommasino’s experience is on the verge of heresy; that is, it holds 
commerce with one of the great rivals, and nourishing alternatives, of 
the Christian confession. In this case, the nourishing alternative is that of 
pantheism. Thus Tommasino’s listening to the voice of the stalk of grass 
is one more episode in a very long and complex story which crosses 
the history of philosophy, and of theology, and of poetry: the story of 
the several efforts to recover a sense of the sacred in the adherence to 
all the things in the world, from the largest to the tiniest. “Expression is 
the one fundamental sacrament,” A. N. Whitehead will say, a little after 
Pirandello’s story, in his Lowell Lectures.7
Let us get back, for some moments, from this broad context to 
the specifi c rhetorical strategy at hand: this story is also an effective 
reminder of how, in the actual implementation of sacred images and 
themes (what I have called elsewhere “theorhetoric”; cf. Valesio 
1984), irony and even the grotesque can play a decisive role, without 
diminishing (on the contrary. . .) the spiritual tension of discourse. The 
image of the “blade of grass” as a symbol of the tiny but important 
things in the world is, by the time Pirandello writes, a philosophical 
topos.8 The interesting theorhetorical twist of this novelette consists in 
literalizing the metaphor: the “blade of grass” thus becomes a blade of 
grass—no longer a passing nod to the variety of the world, a hurried 
way of speaking, but the motor of the whole sequence of events. This 
makes for a mixture of serious and grotesque elements. There is also 
another stab here, aimed at the rhetoric of “rest and recuperation,” with 
its description of the weary man-immersed-in-the-world (intellectual, 
political, or simply mundane man or woman) who goes to the country in 
order to bathe in the spontaneous and innocent simplicity of nature.
This is a vital and persisting discourse, to be sure. (One still 
reads letters from friends and colleagues, many of them professional 
writers, who talk in these terms of their experience of retired living in 
the country.) Yet this discourse is questioned by a modern rhetoric which 
points up the element of illusion implicit in such a
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move, and the many petty or sordid realities which are to be found in 
the places apparently most close to nature. In this sense, Pirandello’s 
text has close antecedents in texts like a well-known narrative essay by 
Giovanni Verga, “Fantasticheria,” in the short story collection Vita dei 
campi (1880; cf. Verga 1940, 15:145-52), or an acidly intelligent novel 
like the one by Joris-Karl Huysmans, En Rade (1887). The ironization 
of this kind of return of the native is not an isolated case in Pirandello’s 
short stories. But this one is remarkable in its heightening of the colors—
and I refer not only to the element of grotesque, but also to that of deadly 
violence. (For this latter dimension, I think of the brilliantly described 
slow crescendo of violence in the famous novel by Benito Pérez Galdós, 
Doña Perfecta [1876].)
A fi nal point on the story—which turned out not to be such 
a minor text, after all. . . . If we do not simply listen to Tommasino 
listening, but (as I proposed) listen to what he is listening to, then we 
have a right (indeed, an obligation) to maintain a critical attitude. I refer 
to Tommasino’s abrupt reaction against Miss Olga.
Let us dare ask a question that is often disdained, as if it were 
too naive, by literary criticism: what passed through Tommasino’s mind 
between the moment in which he saw the blade of grass being ripped 
off and the moment of his exclamation? It is not absurd to surmise that 
Tommasino, who had studied in the seminary, may have thought along 
the lines of refl ections like the following:
       . . .nothing the world has to offer
      —the sensual body,
      the lustful eye,
     pride in possessions—
    could ever come from the Father
   but only from the world
         (1 John 2:16).
Indeed, Miss Olga with the stalk hanging from her mouth must have 
been an emblem of what the Vulgate (with a phrase that rings deeper 
than the “pride of possessions” of the Jerusalem Bible version) calls 
superbia vitae: “life-pride,” or “pride of life.”
But isn’t Tommasino’s reaction to that life-pride a bit too strident, 
too uneasy? (We thus recover what is fruitful, and cannot be ignored, in 
the astute reading.) Isn’t this reaction
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somewhat inconsistent with the terms of Tommasino’s own experience, 
which is teaching him a fully sympathetic acceptance of all things and 
creatures in the world? This is certainly not said in order to score a point 
on Tommasino — but rather, in order to underscore the necessity for 
constant self-criticism (isn’t this, actually, a weaker synonym for soul-
searching?) in the pursuit of the experience of listening.
But we cannot stop here. A systematic listening continues to 
open up broader spaces, both inside and outside; every prolonged act 
of listening prolongs the discourse beyond the individual text. (To 
remain inside it would be like stopping one’s ears in order not to listen.) 
We must then continue to contemplate a blade of grass, without being 
discouraged by Tommasino’s fate.
Etymologists remind us that the sense of blade as in sword-blade 
is secondary with respect to the sense of blade as in blade of grass. The 
original theme is the same that appears in German Blatt “leaf, sheet 
of paper” — something that has interesting implications for a general 
(we might say, a Vichian) rhetoric. For it seems that the key fi gure of 
speech here is not one of hyperbole but one of euphemization: I mean, 
it is not the case that the thing in the meadow is rigidly and phallically 
hyperbolized on the model of the thing in the warrior’s hand; rather it 
is the case that the warrior’s weapon is felt as something so brutally 
disturbing that it must be exorcized by euphemism, and called with the 
same name of the supple thing bending on the meadow.9
This points to an innovative restatement of the ancient topos 
dwelling on the connection between Book and Life—from Whitman’s 
Leaves of Grass to that delicate image that appears in the midst of a 
complicated perspective (a woman telling her lover, who is a writer, 
how she imagines his sister) in a beautiful modern novel of 1900:
Sometimes she would come into your room while you were working 
and lay a blade of grass on the page you had commenced.10
One might speak of an overdetermination of the image, if this 
did not sound like a negative judgment, while on the contrary what is at 
work here enriches our perception of the world. This leaf of grass used 
as a bookmark between two leaves of paper on which writing has begun 
to be traced is a fi gura etymologica rooted in nature. It vividly brings 
before our eyes both the origin of any
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book as a physical object out of the vegetal world, and the possible 
destiny of the book, as a complex of signs which goes back into the 
bosom of nature.
Indeed, if we look at this blade of grass as a representative of 
the green world, we soon discover that we are faced with a powerful 
archetypal image: that viriditas on which the alchemists focused many 
of their meditations—when they considered how blessed Nature makes 
all things new and green blossom out of the putrefaction of matter in 
darkness.11
This cosmic viriditas, this germination of being, may however—
important as it is—distract us from the experience of listening, by 
underscoring a mere looking at. What is crucial, in this turn-of-the-
century period which is still the key to understanding our so-called 
modern literature, is a renewal of that impressive theme: the voice of 
mute things. For, contemporary with the writing of this and other short 
stories by Pirandello, a short masterpiece comes out in Northern Europe, 
as a unique literary document: Hugo von Hofmannstahl’s Letter of Lord 
Chandos, where the hero of the Epistle expresses his dramatic nostalgia 
for a language “in which the mute things speak to me” (. . . die stummen 
Dinge zu mir sprechen). This voice does not have for him only a utopian 
existence. He can hear it, or rather I should say (exploiting the powerful 
Italian crasis, in the verb sentire, of both English “to hear” and English 
“to feel”), he can feel it in certain privileged moments:
The mute and sometimes even inanimate creatures rise toward me 
with such an abundance, such a presence of love, that my enchanted 
eye can fi nd no dead place around me.12
This is not only a literary, but also a philosophical, perspective13—
and one that, as such, must acknowledge and make explicit its link with 
a rich theological tradition.
Once again, one should not be led astray by merely visual and 
imaginative considerations. The voice of the blade of grass and of similar 
mute things is the voice hidden in all processes of miniaturization; 
for miniatures are not only images, but speaking images; suffi ce it to 
remember the acute treatment of the theme of miniature in Bachelard 
1964 [1958]. 
Yet even his important analysis falls short of identifying a key 
emblem which, in linking together the dialectic of
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inside/outside, of enlargement/narrowing, in miniaturization, reveals an 
ontology: an emblem of the growth of forms of being in their spiritual 
nature, beyond sensory divisions and sensual speculations and sensuous 
delimitations. For if every poet is an heir to the fairy-tale hero who 
can hear the grass grow (cf. the lines of poetry quoted in Bachelard 
1964:177), something greater is at work here. The key image is that of 
the small mustard seed which grows into “the biggest shrub of them all” 
(Mark 4:31,32). This image is diffracted and refracted in the visionary 
poly-discourse of the synoptic Gospels, with differences to which 
we cannot be indifferent. In the quoted passage from Mark as in the 
analogous one in Matthew (13:31,32), the mustard seed is a parable of 
the growth of the Kingdom of God: an image which, for all its power, 
is still somewhat abstract and external. But, more challengingly, the 
mustard seed in another place in Matthew (17:20) is—with a signifi cant 
process of interiorization—an emblem of individual faith. And fi nally 
in Luke 13:19 the interpretive potential of this parable is realized when 
this text is immediately followed by the parable of the yeast—homely in 
appearance, but in fact agitating and suggestive. For the leavening of the 
fl our mixed with yeast takes place traditionally overnight (thus evoking, 
by the way, for the Jack and the Beanstalk type of fairy-tale, an intertext 
broader and deeper than the one mentioned in note 3).
Also, the growth of the leavened bread evokes an intercourse 
between man and nature more intimate than that described by the 
sowing of the mustard seed. This kneading is like an embrace: “lovely-
dumb” (as G. M. Hopkins would put it); and yet (and, because of this) 
decisive.
Yale University
Notes
1The ellipses belong to the original text. This and the following translations are 
mine.
2Some other details conspire towards this weakening. For instance, the family name 
of the hero—Unzio—is too transparent an allusion to religious unction.
3We could collate this image with a Freudian analysis of the giant beanstalk growing 
at night, and of the boy climbing on it, in the Jack and the Beanstalk type of fairy-tale, as images 
on one level are connected to a boy’s
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feelings about masturbation. Cf. Bettelheim 1971:171.
4Rhetorical analysis, which constantly follows those intricate genealogies of images 
that make poetry out of prose, can point out here the genealogical link between this carefree, 
mundane, and sexual image of the stalk hanging out of the mouth of a woman in the bloom of 
her youth, with the sickly growth about the mouth of another Pirandellian character, in whose 
case the floral presence is a metaphorical one. I refer to the one-act play “L’uomo dal fiore in 
bocca” (“The man with a flower in his mouth”] (cf. Pirandello 1950 [19261:297-310), where 
reality of that silentiary zone—deadly sickness—takes the surrealistic, Magritte-like drollery out 
of the metaphor and gives it, in its stead, a sinister resonance. This short play or “dialogo” (as 
the author calls it) is the rewriting of an earlier short story (a frequent procedure in Pirandello). 
But the short story was already in dialogic form, so that the dramatic version simply reproduces 
it in full, without adding or taking out anything, but only inserting stage directions. What is 
relevant to the present analysis is the only change made, the title, which in this short story is 
“La morte addosso” (“Death on one’s back”—cf. Pirandello 1923:61-72). This latter title is 
strongly (almost brutally) effective; whereas the rhetoric of the drama’s title, “L’uomo dal fiore 
in bocca,” is an indirect rhetoric of suggestiveness.
5”It is to the invisible that listening may attend” (Ihde 1976:14, emphasized in the 
original). In adhering to this thought, I at the same time must distantiate the present analysis 
from a certain pale punctiliousness in the phenomenological enterprise, which sharply separates 
theology from philosophy and promotes the latter as the only possible enterprise (ibid.:15). 
The present analysis, on the contrary, is built on the refusal of any neatly cut division between 
theology and philosophy.
6On the problem of listening versus seeing, consult Ong 1982.
7“Expression is the one fundamental sacrament. It is the outward and visible sign of an 
inward and spiritual grace. . . this primary expression mainly clothes itself in the media of action 
and of words, but also partly of art” (Whitehead 1971 [1926]:127, in the context of a discourse 
which structures elements of pantheism.)
8Consider the following passage (with a resounding Hegelian ring) that I noted 
from Benedetto Croce’s works (and whose original context I have still to recover): 
“Everything in the Universe is Mind, down to the blade of grass and the worn stone; and 
philosophy is the very consciousness of the Universe.” Such thoughts raise the problem 
of the links between absolute idealism, the traditional religious notions of theism and 
pantheism, and the more specific philosophical underpinnings of these latter. On this, see 
for instance the quoted Alexander 1920, 2:382-401 especially. To be sure, Tommasino’s
pantheistic leanings could be described, as this same philosopher would say, as being of “the 
more popular and easy-going form” (389). But, in the comprehensive rhetorical approach that 
is developed here, there is nothing really easy-going about the philosophical perceptions of the 
common man.
9This euphemistic move is not limited to the Anglo-Saxon linguistic domain: in some 
old Italian texts which maintain a particularly close connection with their dialectal background, 
the blade of the sword is sometimes euphemistically referred to with words normally designating 
the pods of some Leguminosae. (Cf. also that established Italian metaphor: Il filo
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della spada “The edge of the sword.”)
10 cite from the translation of Il Fuoco in D’Annunzio 1914 [1910]:226. The passage 
apears in the second and last part of the novel, called “The Empire of Silence.”
11See, for instance, the eloquent passage quoted in Jung 1954:269 from the anonymous 
alchemical treatise Rosarium Philosophorum (for which Jung uses a German edition of the 
Latin text, in 1550).
12Cf. Hofmannstahl 1979:472 and 469 respectively; English version (here followed 
with some changes) in Hofmannstahl 1952:141 and 138. Composed in August 1902, this 
fictional letter appears in two installments (October 18 and 19, 1902) in the Berlin paper Tag 
(cf. Tarot 1970:360ff.). As for Pirandello’s story, it was first published in the Corriere della 
Sera of December 31, 1911.
13A modern philosophical essay in the style of Christian existentialism like Sciacca 
1962, interesting as it is, is a weaker echo of images like the one in Pirandello’s short story, a 
text which in its turn is paler than the beautifully pulsating images in the quoted Letter of Lord 
Chandos. (But we have to do here with a general strategy of discourse and thought.)
14“The miniature of an entire cosmos that speaks softly (175). . . . We are taught the 
ontology of presentiment. . . this tense state of fore-hearing.. . the weaker the indication, the 
greater the significance, since it indicates an origin (176). . . . the play of the dream devices 
known to us as seeing and hearing, ultra-seeing and ultra-hearing, hearing oneself seeing. . . 
to hear oneself listen” (181). I was reminded of these pages by Brandy Alvarez, who is not 
responsible for the particular development here.
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